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Abstract 
Boolos, G., The analytical completeness of Dzhaparidze’s polymodal logics, Annals of Pure 
and Applied Logic 61 (1993) 95-111. 
The bimodal provability logics of analysis (second-order arithmetic) for ordinary provability 
and provability by (unrestricted application of) the w-rule are shown to be fragments of 
certain ‘polymodal’ logics introduced by G.K. Dzhaparidze. In addition to modal axiom 
schemes expressing Lob’s theorem for the two kinds of provability, the logics treated here 
contain a scheme expressing that if a statement is consistent, then the statement that it is 
consistent is provable by the o-rule. 
Analysis is axiomatic second-order arithmetic with unrestricted comprehension. 
‘t’ means ‘provable in analysis’. 
A formula is w-provable if and only if it is contained in every class containing 
all axioms of analysis, containing all conclusions of applications of the usual 
finitary rules whenever it contains their premisses, and containing the conclusion 
Vx A(x) of an application of the o-rule whenever it contains all the premisses of 
that application, i.e., all formulas A(i), i a natural number. Note that 
o-provability is not the dual of o-consistency: a formula is w-inconsistent if and 
only if it is provable with the aid of at most one application of the o-rule. ‘o t’ 
means ‘o-provable in analysis’. 
The set of o-provable formulas is III:, as it is the intersection of all classes 
meeting a certain arithmetical condition. 
Let 8 be the class of Godel numbers of o-provable formulas. Let O(X) be a II: 
formula of the language of analysis that naturally defines 0. Pr(y, X) is the A:’ 
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formula that naturally defines the proof relation for analysis and Bew(x) is 
3~ Pr(y, x). 
Let ‘G(iidel)L(Gb)P(olymodal)’ and ‘GLS(olovay)P’ denote the fragments of 
Dzhaparidze’s systems GP and GP* of modal propositional logic [2] whose only 
modal operators are [0] and [l]. The main result of the present paper is the 
‘analytical’ completeness of GLP and GLSP, for provability and truth, respec- 
tively, under the reading of [0] as Bew(x) and [l] as O(X). 
Sentences of GLP and GLSP are formed in the standard manner: sentence 
letters and I are sentences, A-+ B is a sentence if A and B are, and [O]A and 
[l]A are sentences if A is. (We write 0 and q instead of [0] and [l].) 
The axioms of GLP are: all tautologies and all sentences 
q (A+ B)+ (OA- q B), El(A+ B)+ (EIA- FIB), 
q (OA-+A)+ q iA, Fl(ElA+A)-, EIA, 
q A+ElA, and flA+EidJA. 
The rules of GLP are modus ponens and Cl-necessitation (if GLP EA, then 
GLP t q A). (GLSP is defined below, in ‘The Truth Case’.) 
Among the theorem schemata of GLP are q A-, q iCiA, ElA-+ EEiA (the proof 
of these proceeds via the usual de Jongh-Sambin-Kripke trick) and CIA+ EKIA. 
And if GLP k A, then GLP k IIIA. 
A realization (translation, interpretation) + is now a function that assigns to 
each sentence letter a sentence of the language of analysis; for each modal 
sentence A we define A@ in the expected manner: 
P@ = Q(P)2 I@= I, (A+B)@‘=(A++B+), 
@A)@‘= Bew( rA@l), and (ElA)@ = O( IA@‘). 
(We write Bew[ ] and O[ ] instead of Bew( r ‘) and O( r ‘).) 
Our main theorems are the equivalence of (1) and (2) and that of (3) and (4): 
(1) For all 4, k A? 
(2) GLPtA. 
(3) For all $, A is true. 
(4) GLSP 1 A. 
These results extend an old completeness theorem of Solovay’s [S, p. 3021, 
according to which GL is the modal logic of w-provability in analysis. Their 
proofs combine ideas due to Solovay [9], Dzhaparidze [2], and Ignatiev [3]. 
Further acknowledgments and historical information are given at the end of the 
paper. 
To prove that (2) implies (l), it is enough to show, as was observed in [9], that 
O(X) and analysis satisfy the analogues of the three Hilbert-Bernays-Lob 
derivability conditions (for all sentences S, S’): 
(i) if l-S, then t- O[S]; 
(ii) t O[(S* S’)]-, O[S]+ O[S’]; and 
(iii) t O[S]* O[O[S]]. 
The analytical completeness of Drhaparidze’s polymodal logics 97 
To obtain a proof of the soundness of the axioms .El(ElA -+A)+ ElA, simply 
repeat the derivation of the formalization of Lob’s theorem, using O(x) instead 
of Bew(x). As for TIA - EHZIA, formalize in analysis the following argument. 
Suppose that not IA @; then for every i, i is not the Godel number of a proof of 
A’@; then for every i, tlPf(i, ‘A’#“); thus by one application of the w-rule, 
w t VX lPf(x rA @‘). i.e , 7 ., w klBew[A@]. The soundness proofs for the other 
axioms and rules are entirely routine. 
Now (i) and (ii) are sufficiently evident. And since O[S] is a III: sentence, (iii) 
follows from (iv): 
(iv) If S is a IIt sentence, then k S* O[S]. 
The formalization in analysis of the following argument, which shows that any 
true II’, sentence S is w-provable, establishes (iv): 
Suppose that Vf 3xRf(x) holds, where R, as usual, defines a primitive 
recursive relation R such that if RF(x) holds, so does RJ‘(y), for all y 2x. f(x) is 
the standard code of the finite sequence (f(O),f(l), . . . ,f(x - 1)). (Thus, for 
any f, f(O) codes the empty sequence ( ).) For notation and elementary 
background on II: sets, we may refer the reader to [7]. 
We wish to show that w k Vf 3s R!(x). 
Let Set = {s: s codes a finite sequence and w t Vf 3x Rs *f(x)}. 
Lemma 1. If Rs, then s E Sec. 
Proof. Suppose Rx Then t Rs, w k Rs, w k Rs * ( ), w t Vf Rs *f (0), and 
therefore w I- Vf 3x Rs *f(x). 0 
Lemma 2. If for all i, s * i E See, then s E Sec. 
Proof. Suppose for all i, w t Vf 3x Rs * i *f(x). Then by the w-rule, 
wtVyVf 3xRs*y*f(x). Thus w t- Vg Vf 3x Rs * g(0) *f(x) and so 
w kVf 3xRs*f(x). 0 
Suppose now that ( ) $ Sec. Define g by g(0) = ( ) and g(n + 1) =g(n) * 
pi[g(n) * i $ Set if g(a) *i r$ Set for some i, and i = 0 otherwise]. By Lemma 2, 
for every rz, g(n) $ Sec. By Lemma 1, for every n, not Rg(n). Let f(n) = 
(g(n + l))n. Th en f or every II, not Rf(n), which contradicts our supposition that 
Vf 3n Rf(n). Thus ( ) ESec, i.e., w FVf 3xR( ) *f(x), and so 
w t Vf 3x Rf(x). 
Hence if S is a IIt sentence and thus equivalent to a sentence Vf 3x Rf(x) (R 
primitive recursive), then S is w-provable if it is true. 
Thus (2) implies (1). To prove the converse, we need certain definitions and 
lemmas concerning the constructive ordinals. Since we shall need to see that our 
treatment of these matters can be formalized in analysis, we shall proceed rather 
98 G. Boolos 
carefully. At the outset let us note that since all ordinals under discussion are 
countable, we may regard quantification over such ordinals as disguised quan- 
tification over well-orderings of natural numbers (which, in turn, is to be 
understood as quantification over whatever objects the second-order variables of 
analysis range over) and mention of ordinal relations (e.g., < or =) and ordinal 
functions (e.g., +) as involving claims about the existence of appropriate 
well-orderings of natural numbers and order-preserving maps between them (a la 
Cantor). The existence of the necessary relations and maps will be guaranteed by 
the (unrestricted) comprehension schema of analysis. 
(0, CO) is the standard system of notations for the constructive ordinals. If 
a E 0, ]a] is the ordinal denoted by a, and then 2” E 6’ and denotes ]a] + 1. The 
well-foundedness of cB can of course be proved in analysis. 
Q = {b E 0: lb] < la]}. 
The following result is well-known, but it will not be amiss to present a proof of 
it here. We follow [7, p. 281, but with a slight emendation. 
Lemma 3. {(a, b): uEBr\b$0a} &II;. 
Proof. The existence of an r.e. relation <’ such that for all u, b E 6, a <‘b iff 
a <,b is proved in [7, p. 141 (a <’ b = a E Wpcb,). We shall need to observe that 
(*) if 2d E 6, y = 3*5”, and for all n, ]{w}(n)] < Id] and {w}(n) <’ {w}(n + l), 
then y E 6 and ]y] < ]2d]. 
For, if the antecedent holds, then, since d E 0’ and for every n, I { w}(n)1 < Jdl, for 
every n, {w}(n) E 0 and therefore {w}(n) co {w}(n + l), whence y E 0 and 
IY I s VI < Pdl- 
Now let 
A(R)=V~VyVz(Rx,y,z-+z=Ovz=l) 
A VZK [3y (Rx, y, 0 v Rx, y, I)+ Vy (k, Y, O++lRx, y, I)] 
A Vy Rl, y, 0 A Ve (3.5’ E CT’-, Vy (R3-5e, y, 1 f, 3n R(e)(n), y, 1)) 
/Vd{2d~O+‘y(R2d,y,1++[y=1v3z(y=2”/\Rd,z,1) 
v 3w (y = 3.5” A Vn (Rd, {w}(n), 1 A {w}(n) <’ {w}(n + I)))])}. 
Let R *x, y, z iff x E 0 and either (y E s;i and z = 1) or (y $ OX and z = 0). 
With the aid of (*) we have by induction on cB that A(R*), and also that if 
A(R), then for all x E 0, Vy Vz (R*x, y, z -Rx, y, z). Since x E 6’ if R*x, y, z, 
Vx Vy Vz (R*x, y, z-Rx, y, z). Therefore R*x, y, z iff VR (A(R)+ Rx, y, z). 
A(R) is a E:-condition on R (all occurrences of “E 0” are in negative position in 
A(R), and hence in positive position in “VR (A(R)+ Rx, y, z)“). Thus R* is II:, 
and therefore so is 
{(a, b): a E OA b 4 Qa}, = {(a, 6): R*u, b, O}. El 
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Lemma 4. There is a II: relation < with domain 8 such that { (x, y ) : x, y E 8 A 
x < y} reflexively well-orders 0; moreover, if x E 8 and y 4 0, then x < y. (Thus 
x=yifx<yandy<x.) 
Proof. (Uses no assumption about 0 other than that it is ni.) 
Since 8 is fl: and 6 is I7:-complete, there is a recursive function g such 
that for all numbers x, x E 0 iff g(x) E 6. 
Define x 6 y by: 
(g(x) e 0 A g(y) $O&) A ((29(I) l B A g(y) 4 Gm) v x sy>- 
By Lemma 3, 6 is a fl: relation. We now show that x < y iff (**)g(x) E 0 A 
[g(y) e 0-t Ig(x)l < lg(y)l v (I&)l = ldy)l AX sr)l. Suppose x <Y. Then 
g(x) E 0. Assume g(y) E 0. Then [g(x)1 and lg(y)l are defined. If Jg(y)( < lg(x)l, 
then g(y) e %x)9 impossible. Thus either [g(x)1 < [g(y)1 or [g(x)1 = (g(y)J; but if 
the latter, then g(y) E 6&, whence x s y, and (**) holds. Conversely, suppose 
(**) holds. Then g(x) E 0, and then also 2g(x) E 6. If g(y) E OgcX,, then g(y) E 0 
and (g(y)1 < lg(x)l, impossible. Thus g(y) 4 Og’g(Xj. But if g(y) E 6&, then 
g(y) l 0 and Ig(yN < I&N + 1; but since not Is( < Idx)l, I&>l = I&N, and 
therefore x c y. 
It is clear from the equivalence of x < y and (**) that x is in the domain of =5 iff 
g(x) E 0, i.e., iff x E 8. Moreover, if x, y E 8, then g(x), g(y) E 6, and then either 
Ig(x)l < Idyll, MyI < I&)L or both I&)l = lg(y)l and either x SY or Y 6~. 
Thus < reflexively well-orders 8. And if x E 19 and y $ 0, then (**), and so 
x+y. 0 
Let p(x, y) be a fl: formula of analysis naturally defining <. The preceding 
definitions, claims, lemmas, and proofs can be carried out in analysis, and 
therefore the sentences (naturally constructed from p(x, y) and O(x)) stating that 
6 reflexively linearly orders 8 and that x < y provided that x E 8 and y $ 8 can be 
formulated and proved in analysis. ’ 
We now define the subsystem LN of GLP. LN was isolated by Ignatiev. 
The axioms of LN are: all tautologies and all sentences 
q (A + B) + (OA + q B), El(A-tB)+(ElA+U3), 
q (OA+A)+ CIA, q (ElA-,A)+ DA, 
!IlA+ EICIA, and XlA-+ EMIlA. 
(OA-+ !?!A is not an axiom schema of LN.) 
’ In particular, the reducibility of 0 to 0, it will be recalled, may be proved by effectively, and 
uniformly in x, converting the Brouwer-Kleene ordering K derived from 0 and x into another linear 
ordering L with certain desirable properties (e.g., the order type of L = w. c + 1, where c is the 
order type of K; successors and limits in L can be effectively recognized) and using the recursion 
theorem to define a function f on the field of L such that x E f3 iff K is a well-ordering, iff f embeds L 
into co, iff g(x) E 0, g(x) being the image under f of the last element of L. Cf. [6, pp. 205-2121. The 
formalization in analysis presents no special difficulties. 
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The rules of LN are modus ponens, O-necessitation, and D-necessitation. 
ThusLNkOA+UlJA, LNtElA+ElElA, and if LNtA, then GLPtA. 
As for the semantics of LN, an LN-model M is a quadruple ( W, R, S, V), 
where W is a finite set, V E W X {sentence letters}, R and S (which will interpret 
0 and Ei, respectively) are transitive and irreflexive relations on W such that for 
all w, x, y E W, if WSX and WRY, then xRy; and if wSx and xRy, then WRY. Thus 
not both wRx and WSX: otherwise xRx, contradicting irreflexivity of R. 
V is the evaluator or ‘forcing’ component of M: thus M, w kp iff wVp. The 
truth-functional clauses of the definition of k are as usual. And as indicated, 
M, w k q A iff for all x such that WRX, M,x k A; and M, w k EIA iff for all x such 
that WSX, M,x ka. 
The proof of soundness and completeness of LN with respect to LN-models is 
an almost completely routine extension of the soundness and completeness proof 
for GL given, say, in [l, Chapter 271. We omit the soundness proof. 
For the completeness proof, suppose LN X A, define a formula to be a 
subsentence of A or the negation of one, define W to be the set of maximal 
LN-consistent sets of formulas; and define V, R, and S by: 
wVpiffpeW; 
wRx iff (a) for all formulas [7B E w, q B and B are in x; and (b) for some 
formula CID EX, q D 4 w; and 
wSx iff (a) for all formulas ElB E w, EM3 and B are in x; (b) for all formulas 
UC, UC E w iff UC E x; and (c) for some formula ED E x, EID $ w. 
Then, as is readily verified, M = ( W, R, S, V), is an LN-model. 
One then proves by induction on the complexity of subsentences B of A that 
for all w in W, (M,) w k B iff B E w. The 0 case is as in the completeness proof 
for GL. Suppose B = EIC. 
If EiC E w and WSX, then C E x, whence by the I.H., x L C; so w k EC. 
Assume EIC $ w. Then +ZlC E w. Let 
x = {lC, q C} u {D, EID: KID E w} u {DE: q E E w} u (10F: -KiF E w}. 
If X is inconsistent, then 
LN~/\{D,~D:~D~w}A/\{UE:OE~W} 
A A {1OF: +JF E w} -+ (ElC-+ C), 
LN t /j {mD, 0330: EID E w} A /j {EIOE: q !E E w} 
A /J {kOF: 1OF E w} + q (ElC--, C), 
LN~I”\{~D:~DEw}A/\{OE:OEEW} 
A /j (1OF: -ElF E w} -+ Elc, 
and w is inconsistent. Thus X is consistent, and so for some maximal consistent x, 
X c x, whence wSx. Since 1C E x, C 4 x, x I# C (I.H.), and so w # q C. The rest of 
the completeness proof is as usual. 
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Some relations 
wCx iff WRX v WSX v 3y(wRySx). 
WTX iff w=xvwCx. 
T is transitive, as is readily verified. 
wQx iff wCx v 32 (zSw A zCx), i.e., iff wCx v 32 (ZSW A 2Sx). 
Generated submodels. Let Ww = {x: wTx}. Let M 1 w = (Ww, R fl Ww*, S fl 
Ww*, V 1 Ww). The generated submodel theorem is that for all sentences A, if 
x E Ww, then M,x LA iff M 1 w,x LA. The proof is perfectly straightforward, since 
Ww is closed under both R and S. 
Definitions. M = ( W, R, S, V), is A-complete if for all x E W, M,x k q B+ EIB 
for all subsentences q B of A. 
AAisA~OA~ElA~UE!A. 
MA is l\{A(ClB + !XlB):OB is a subsentence of A}. 
Lemma 5. M 1 w is A-complete iff M, w k MA. 
We omit the routine proof. 
We now begin the proof that (1) implies (2). Suppose that GLPXA. Then 
LNY MA +A (otherwise since LN 5 GLP and GLP t MA, GLP t A). By the 
completeness theorem for LN, there are a model M and a world e such that 
M,e k MA and M,e #A. By the generated submodel theorem, we may suppose 
that M = M ( e, and therefore by Lemma 4 that M is A-complete. Without loss of 
generality, suppose that W = (1, . . . , n} and e = 1. 
Lemma 6. Let N = ( W, Q, S, V). Then for any subsentence B of A, M, w k B iff 
N,wkB. 
Proof. We need only consider the case in which B = q C. Suppose N, w k DC. If 
WRX, then wQx, and therefore N,x k C, whence by the I.H., M,x k C; thus 
M,w kOC. 
So suppose M, w k UC, but N, w # UC. Then for some x, wQx and N,x # C, and 
by the I.H., M,x # C. Clearly, not WRX. If wSx, wRySx, or ZSW and zSx, then 
respectively M, w # EiC, M,y # IYIC, or M,z # UC, and then by A-completeness of 
M, respectively M, w # UC, M,y # UC, or M,z !# UC, whence for some a, M,a # C, 
and respectively wRa, wRyRa, or ZSW and zRa, and then in each case wRa, 
whence M,a F C, contradiction. 0 
Solovay sentences. Extend R so that also ORx for all x in W. 
Say that a function h: (0, . . . , m} + W U (0) is w-OK if h(0) = 0, h(m) = w, 
for all i<m, either h(i) Rh(i+ 1) or h(i)Sh(i+l), and for no i, h(i)Sh(i+l) 
R h(i + 2). Call h OK if h is w-OK for some w. W is finite, and thus there are 
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only finitely many w-OK functions h. In what follows we assume that h and h’ are 
OK and that their domains are (0, . . . , m} and (0, . . . , m’}. There is a unique 
least k < m such that h(i) S h(i + 1) for all i 2 k. (If m = 0, k = 0; otherwise, since 
h(O)Rh(l), k>O. Thus h(0)R.e.R*--Rh(k)S-0.S.+.Sh(m), and if m> 
0, h(O)Rh(l)R.-.R.--Rh(k)S...S-. . S h(m).) Let k’ be similarly defined 
from h’. 
By the generalized diagonal lemma, there exist sentences So, S,, . . . , S, such 
that for each w E W U {0}, 
tS,t,w=w~V{A,r\B,r\C~~D~:hisw-OK}, 
where A,, is 
A A 
i: iik x: h(i)Rx 
3b [Pf(b, ‘lSh(i+ij’) A Va < b lPf(a, ‘IS,‘)], 
B,, is 
A iBew( r-6X1), 
x: h(k)Rx 
ch is 
and Dh is 
/j lO( ‘lS,‘). 
x: h(m)& 
(Notice that the occurrences of “S,” and “Sh(i+r)” in the definitions of Ah, 
Bh, C,, and Dh all lie inside occurrences of “r- . .l”.) For every w E W U {0}, 
there exists a w-OK h (e.g., ((0, 0), (1, w)} if w #O, and ((0, 0)) if w =O), 
and if w # w’, h is w-OK, and h’ is w’-OK, then h Zh’. If w # w’, SW is not the 
same sentence as S,,,.. Let us observe that Ah is 2:, Bh is n’i, C, is II:, and D,, is 
2:. 
We write AB,, instead of Ah A B,, etc. 
Call h S-free if for no i <m, h(i) S h(i + 1). If h is S-free, then k = m. 
Say that h’ R-extends h if m cm’, for all i cm, h(i) = h’(i), and for all i, 
m <i <m’, h’(i) R h’(i + 1). S-extends is defined similarly. If h is S-free and h’ 
R-extends h, then h’ is also S-free. 
Lemma 7. Zf h Zh’, then I- l(ABCDh A ABCDhc). 
Proof. Case 1: For some j, h(j) and h’(j) are defined and unequal. Let j be the 
least such. Since h(0) = 0 = h’(O), j = i + 1 for some i. Then h(i) = h’(i). Let 
x = h(i + l), x’ = h’(i + 1). 
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Case a: i < k and i < k’. Then h(i) Rx, h’(i) Rx’, one of the conjuncts of A, is 
the sentence 3b (Pf(b, r%X1) A Va <b lPf(a, ‘l&,‘)) and one of the conjuncts 
of Ah, is the sentence 3b (Pf(b, ‘TS,.‘) A Va < blPf(a, ‘l&‘)). But +, is 
not the same sentence as lSX,, and therefore these two sentences are 
incompatible. 
Case b: i <k and i 2 k’. Then i = k’, h(i) Rx, h’(i) Sx’, one of the conjuncts 
of Ah is the sentence 3b (Pf(b, ‘l&‘) A Vu <b lPf(a, ‘l&.‘)) and since 
h’(i) = h(i) Rx, one of the conjuncts of B,. is the sentence lBew( ‘lSX1). Again, 
these sentences are incompatible. 
Case c: i 2 k and i < k’. Like case b. 
Case d: i 2 k and i 3 k’. Then h(i) Sx, h’(i) Sx’, one of the conjuncts of C, is 
the sentence p( ‘is, , ’ rTix81), and one of the conjuncts of C,. is the sentence 
p( f$l, ‘I&~). Again, these are different sentences and incompatible in 
analysis. 
Case 2: h’ properly extends h. Then m <rn’ and h(m) = h’(m). Let x = 
h’(m + 1). 
Case a: h(m) Rx. Then lBew( rl,SX1) is a conjunct of B,, and 3b [Pf(b, 
‘I&‘) A Vu <b lPf(a, rlSX1)] is a conjunct of A,.. But these are incompatible. 
Case b: h(m) Sx. Then lO( ‘l&‘) is a conjunct of Dh and p( ‘IS,‘, ‘l&‘) is 
a conjunct of C,.. But these, again, are incompatible. 0 
Let h*x be the function g with domain (0, . . . , m + l}, such that for all i < m, 
g(i) = h(i) and g(m + 1) =x. 
Lemma 8. Let h be S-free. FA,,+ Bh v V {A,*,: h(m) Rx}. 
Proof. Since h is S-free, k = m. Formalize in analysis: if Ah holds but B, does 
not, then for some x such that h(m) Rx, there is a proof of lSX, and hence for 
some x, h(m) Rx and for every y Zx such that h(m) R y, 3, has a proof with a 
smaller Godel number than any proof of 3,. Then h*x is OK and Ahax 
holds. Cl 
Lemma 9. Let h be S-free tAr,-+ABh v V {AB,,: h' R-extends h}. 
Proof. There is a maximum element, n, that may belong to the domain of any h. 
To prove the lemma, then, it suffices to suppose that it holds for all S-free h’ 
whose domain has maximal element m + 1 and show that it holds for all S-free h 
(whose domain has maximal element m). By Lemma 8, 
t-Ah + (Bh v V {A,.,: h(m)Rx}). 
If h(m) Rx, then h*x is S-free and its domain has maximal element m + 1. Thus 
for each x such that h(m) Rx, 
t A/z-x --tABhaX v V {AB,,: h' R-extends h*x}, 
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whence 
FAh-, (ABI, v V{(AB,., v V{ABh.: R-extends h*x}): h(m) Rx}). 
But then we are done, since h’ R-extends h if and only if for some x, h(m) Rx 
and h’ is identical with or R-extends h*x. 0 
Lemma 10. Let h be S-free. 1 AB,, +ABCD, v V {ABC,.,: h(m) Sx}. 
Proof. Since h is S-free, k = m. Now formalize in analysis: Suppose A,, and Bh 
hold. Since k = m, C, holds trivially. Then either for no x such that h(m) Sx is 
3, in 8, in which case Dh also holds, or for some x such that h(m) Sx is lS, is in 
8, and there is then a unique x such that h(m) Sx and p( r-SX1, rlSyl) holds for 
all y such that h(m) Sy. And then Ahex, BhBx, and C,,., all hold. (The claim that 
the argument of this proof and that of the next lemma can be formalized in 
analysis rests on an appeal to the formalizability in analysis of the proof of 
Lemma 4.) Cl 
Lemma 11. lABCh+ D,, v V {ABC,*.,: h(m) Sx}. 
Proof. Formalize in analysis: If ABC, holds but Dh does not, then for some x 
such that h(m) S x, TS, is in 8, and hence for some x, h(m) S x and for every y 
such that h(m)Sy, ~(~3 X1, r~S,,l ) holds. Then h *x is OK and ABC,,., 
holds. 0 
Lemma 12. I- ABC, + A BCD,, v V {A BCD, : h ’ S-extends h}. 
Proof. Like that of Lemma 9. It suffices to suppose that Lemma 12 holds for all 
h’ whose domain has maximal element m + 1 and show that it holds for h (whose 
domain has maximal element m). By Lemma 11, 
tABC,+(D, v V {ABChaX: h(m) Sx}). 
If h(m) Sx, then the domain of h*x has maximal element m + 1. Thus for each x 
such that h(m) Sx, 
I- ABC,., +ABCD&., v V{ABCD,,: h’ S-extends h*x}, 
whence 
tABC,* (ABCD, v V {(ABCD,,., v V {(ABCD,,: h’ S-extends 
h *x}): h(m) S x}). 
But then we are done, since h’ S-extends h if and only if for some x, h(m) Sx and 
h’ is identical with or S-extends h*x. 0 
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Lemma 13. Zfx, x’ E W U {0}, and x fx’, then I- l(S, A S,,). 
Proof. Let h be x-OK, h’ x’-OK. Since x #x’, h fh’. Lemma 13 then follows 
from Lemma 7. 0 
Recall that WCX iff either WRX or wSx or wRySx for some y. 
Lemma 14. Let h be S-free. t Ah-+Shcmj v V {s,: h(m) Cx}. 
Proof. By Lemma 9, 
kAh+ABh v V {AB,,,: h' R-extends h}. 
By Lemma 10, 
tAB,+ABCD, v v {ABC,.,: h(m)Sx}. 
h is certainly h(m)-OK. Thus t A BCD, + Shcm,. Suppose h(m) Sx. Then 
h(m) Cx. h*x is x-OK. By Lemma 12, 
tABC,, -+ABCD,,., v V {ABCD,,,: h’ S-extends h*x}. 
tABCD h*x*Sx. Suppose h’ S-extends h*x. Then h(m) Sx Sh’(m’), and so 
h(m) Ch’(m’). h’ is h’(m’)-OK. Thus we have kABCD,.-+S,,,,,,, In sum, 
tA&+S/z,,, v V {&: h(m) Cx}. 
Now drop the suppositions that h(m) Sx and that h’ S-extends h*x, but suppose 
that h’ R-extends h. Then h’ is S-free and h(m) R h’(m’), whence 
h(m) Ch’(m’). By Lemma 10, 
tAB,,+ABCD,,, v v {ABC,,.+,: h’(m’) Sx}. 
h’ is h’(m’)-OK. Thus t ABCD,,+ &(,,+ Suppose h’(m’) Sx. Then h(m) Cx 
and h’*x is x-OK. By Lemma 12, 
t ABC,,, +ABCD,.., v V {ABCD,,,,: h”S-extends h’*x}. 
t ABCD,,re,-+ S,. Suppose h” S-extends h’*x. Then h(m) R h’(m’) Sx Sh”(m”), 
and h(m) Ch”(m”). h” is h”(m”)-OK. Thus t- ABCDhsp-+ Sh,,+,,,. In sum, if h’ 
R-extends h, then tABh,-+ V {S,: h(m) Cx}, and since tAh+ABh v 
V CAB,,: h’ R-extends h}, we are done. 0 
Lemma 15. 1 ABC, + Shcm, v V {S,: h(m) Sx}. 
Proof. Since h is h(m)-OK, kABCD,+S,,,,. And if h’ S-extends h, then 
h(m)Sh’(m’), and kABCD,.-+S,.,,.,. By Lemma 12 we are done. 0 
Lemma 16. k V {SW: w E W U (0)). 
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Proof. Let h = { (0, 0)). h is S-free. By Lemma 14, 
kA,+S,,,, v V {S,: h(m) Cx}, i.e., FAh+SO v V{&: OCx}. 
Since OCx if ORx, and ORx for all x in W, tAh-, V {S,,,: w E W U (0)). But 
m = 0, whence t Ah, done. q 
Lemma 17. Suppose wRx. Then k S,,,+ iBew[lS,]. 
Proof. Let h be w-OK. Then h(m) = w and either h(k) = h(m) or h(k) S h(m). 
In either case, h(k) Rx. But then we are done: 
k B,, + iBew[+,]. 0 
Lemma 18. Suppose WSX. Then t S, + lO[lS,]. 
Proof. Let h be w-OK. Then h(m) = w and we are done: 
t D~‘~O[~SX]. 0 
Recall that wQx iff either wCx or for some z, ZSW and ZCX. 
Lemma 19. Suppose w # 0. Then I- S,,,+ Bew[V {S,: wQx}]. 
Proof. Let h’ be w-OK. Let h be ‘the initial R-segment’ of h’, i.e., 
h: (0, . . . , k’}+ W U (0) and for all i Sk’, h(i) = h’(i). Then h is S-free, 
k = m = k’, and either h(m) S w or h(m) = w. In either case if h(m) Cx, then 
wQx. By Lemma 14, 
1 A,, + S+,z) v V {&: h(m) Cx>, 
and so FAh-fShcmj v V {&: wQx}. By standard properties of Bew, 
t Bew[AJ+ Bew[S,(,, v V {S,: wQx}]. 
Since w # 0, h(1) is defined, m = k = i + 1 for some i, and 
k Ah + Bew( r+$(i+ljl), i.e., k Ah + Bew[lS,+,]. 
Since Ah is .Zy, t Ah + Bew[A,]. So by standard properties of Bew, 
t Ah* Bew[V {S,: wQx}]. 0 
Lemma 20. Suppose w #O. Then F S,,,+- O[V {S,: wSx}]. 
Proof. Let h be w-OK. Then h(m) = w, and since w # 0, m = i + 1 for some i, 
and either k = m, in which case k Ah+ Bew[-+,J, or k < m, in which case 
t C, + O[lS,+J. Since 1 Bew(x) + O(x), in either case, t ABC, ---, @[l&l. By 
Lemma 15, EABCh+S, v V {S,: wSX}. Then, by (i) and (ii), 
t @[ABC,]-+ @[SW v v {Sx: wSx}]. 
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Since ABC, is a n: sentence, by (iv), t ABC, - @[ABC,]. Thus 
t-ABC,* O[S,,, v // {S,: wSx}] A O[l&], 
whence by (i) and (ii), kABC,+ @[V {S,: wSx}], done. 0 
Lemma 21. If w E W, then t S,+ O[lS,,,]. 
Proof. By Lemma 20, kS, + O[V {Sx: wSx>]. If wSx, then w #x, and by 
Lemma 13, kS,+lS,. Thus t//{S,: wSx}-t?S,, and by (i) and (ii), 
k O[V {S,: wSx}]+ O[q$,]. 0 
We now define $: for any sentence letter p, G(p) = V {S,: wVp}. 
Lemma 22. Let B be a subsentence of A, w E W. Then if M, w k B, then 
tS,,,-+B@‘;andifM,w!#B, thenkS,,,-+lB@. 
Proof. By induction on B. Suppose B =p. Then if w kp, S, is one of the 
disjuncts of p@. If w #p, then by Lemma 13, S,,, is incompatible with each disjunct 
of p? 
The propositional calculus cases are routine. 
Suppose B = DC. 
If M, w k UC, then by Lemma 6, N, w k UC. Thus for all x such that WQX, 
NJ F C, and by Lemma 6 for all x such that WQX, M,x k C, whence by the I.H., 
for all x such that WQX, k Sx-+ C @. (If WQX, then x E W, since ORw, and so not 
OSw.) Thus t V {S,: WQX} -+ C+, and so k Bew[V {S,: wQx}]-+ B@. By Lemma 
19, t S,,,-+ Bew[V {&: wQx}], and so t S,+ B? 
If M,w f UC, then for some x, wRx, M,xfC, and by the I.H., tS,-+X’@, 
whence 1 lBew[lS,] + lB@‘. By Lemma 17, t &,+ lBew[lS,], and so l- S,+ 
TB? 
Suppose B = FIG. 
If M, w k IX, then for all x such that wSx, M,x k C, and by the I.H., for all x 
such that WSX, 1 S,+ C’? So t V {Sx: wSx}-+ C@, and thus t O[V S,: wS.r}]-, 
B? By Lemma 20, k S,-+ O[V{S,: wSX}], whence 1 S,,,* B? 
If M, w # DC, then for some x, WSX, M,x # C, and by the I.H., t S,* lC@‘, 
whence t ++Sx] -+ 1B ? By Lemma 18, t S,,,+lO[?$], tS,-+lB? 
Done. 0 
We conclude in the usual manner: By Lemma 22, 1 S1 *iA? Thus 
t lBew[lS,] + lBew[A @I. By Lemma 17, t S,,-,lBew[lS,]. So k S,-+ 
iBew[A@]. We now appeal to the soundness of analysis with the unrestricted 
w-rule: By Lemma 21, 1 S, -+ O[l&,] for all w in W; thus if w E W and S,,, is 
true, then is,,, is w-provable and therefore S, is false.’ By Lemma 16, 
t v {&: w E w u {O}}, and therefore one of So, S,, + . . , S,? is true. Thus it is S,, 
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that is true. And since t- S,,-, lBew[A@], lBew[A@] is true and A@ is not 
provable. 
The Truth Case 
GLSP is the system whose axioms are all theorems of GLP and all sentences 
EiA-+A, and whose sole rule is modus ponens. All sentences q !A-+A are thus 
theorems of GLSP. 
We want to show that GLSP ‘r A iff A@ is true for all $. Let 
HA = /j {UC-+ C: UC is a subsentence of A} 
A A (0C-t C: DC is a subsentence of A}. 
Since soundness is evident, it will suffice to show that if GLPY (HA-A), then 
A@’ is false for some 4. 
So suppose that GLP X (HA -+ A). Then for some W = (0, . . . , n}, M = 
((0,. . . , n}, R, S, V), M is (HA + A)-complete and hence A-complete, and 
M,O #HA + A. (Note. 0, not 1, is the world at which HA+ A is false.) Thus 
M,OkHA and M,Oi#A. 
Define the Solovay sentences as before. 
Let WQ’X iff wQxvw=x=Ovx=OSw, WS’X iff wSxvw=x=O, and 
N’ = (W, Q’, S’, V). 
Lemma 6’. For any subsentence B of A, M, w k B ifs N’, w k B. 
Proof. By induction. We need only consider the cases in which B = UC or EIC. 
Assume B = UC. Suppose N’,w k q C. If wRx, then wQ’x, and therefore 
N’,xkC, whence by the I.H., M,xkC; thus M,wkOC. 
Suppose M,w k q IC, but N’,w #UC. Then for some x, wQ’x and 
N’,x # C, and by the I.H., M,x f C. Clearly, not wRx. If WSX, wRySx, or 
ZSW and ZSX, then respectively M, w # EIC, M,y # LX, or M,z i# UC, and then by 
A-completeness of M, respectively M, w # q C, M,y I# UC, or M,x !# q IC, whence 
for some a, M,a I/ C, and respectively wRa, wRyRa, or zSw and zRa, and then in 
each case wRa, whence M,a k C, contradiction. If w =x = 0, then since M,O k 
HA, M,O k UC+ C, M,O k C, contradiction. If x = OSw, then since M,x # C and 
M,O k HA, M,O L# q C, and then for some a, ORa and M,a # C; but then since OSw 
and ORa, wRa and so M,a k C, contradiction. 
Assume B = UC. If N’,w k EIC, then for all x such that wS’x, N’w k C, whence 
for all x such that WSX, N’,x k C, whence by the I.H., M, w k EIC. If M,w k EIC, 
then if w=x=O, then since M,w!=HA, M,wkE!C+C, and M,xkC, as is also 
the case if wSx. Thus if wS’x, then M,x k C, whence by the I.H., N’,x k C, Thus 
N’,wkElC. 0 
Lemma 19’. t S,-t Bew[V {S,: wQ’x}]. 
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Proof. Let h’ be w-OK. As in the proof of Lemma 19, let h be ‘the initial 
R-segment’ of h’. Then as before, 
t&z + &z(m) v V {S,: h(m) Cx} and 
1 Bew[&]-+ Bew[S,(,, v V {&: wQx}]. 
Case 1: m=k=i+l forsomei. As before, 
t Ah + Bew[V {&: wQx}], whence k A, -+ Bew[V {S,: wQ’x}]. 
Case2: m=k=O. Thenh(m)=OandkA,, andthereforekS,,vV{S,:OCx}. 
Assume w = 0. Then if x = 0 or OCx, wQ’x. Assume w # 0. Then OSw, since h’ is 
w-OK. Thus if x = 0, wQ’x, and if OCx, then wQx and thus wQ’x. In each 
case, 1 V {S,: wQ’x}. Thus 1 Bew[V {S,: wQ’x}], and therefore t Ah+ 
Bew[V {S,: wQ’x}]. 
In both cases, FA, --, Bew[V {S,: wQ’x}], done. 0 
Lemma 20’. t SW-, O[V {S,: wS’x}]. 
Proof. Let h be w-OK. Then h(m) = w. 
Case 1: w # 0. Then as in the proof of Lemma 20, 
k ABC, + @[v {&: wk}], whence t ABC, + O[V {&: wS’X}]. 
Case 2: w = 0. By Lemma 15, tABCh-tSW v V {S,: wSX}. Then, by (i) and 
(ii), 
k @[ABC,]+ @[SW v v {S,: wSX}]. 
Since ABC, is a fit sentence, by (iv) we have kABCh-+ @[ABC,]. Thus 
t ABC, + @[SW v // {S,: wSX}], 
i.e., 
1 ABCh + O[v {S,: wS’x}]. Cl 
Let q5(p) = V {SW: wVp}. 
Lemma 22’. Let B be a subsentence of A. Then if M, w k B, then t SW -+ B @‘; and $ 
M,w #B, then I- S,+lB? 
Proof. By induction on B. The atomic and propositional calculus cases are as 
usual. So suppose B = UC. 
If M, w b UC, then by Lemma 6’, N’, w k q C. Thus for all x such that wQ’x, 
N’J k C, and by Lemma 6’ for all x such that wQ’x, M,x 1 C, whence by the 
I.H., for all x such that wQ’x, t S,-+C”. Thus t V {&: wQ’x}+ C@, and so 
l- Bew[V {S,: wQ’x}]+ B? By Lemma 19’, t S,,,* Bew[V {S,: wQ’x}], and so 
tS,*B@. 
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If M, w # q C, then for some x, WRX, M,x ‘# C, and by the I.H., k SX+lC@, 
whence 1 iBew[iS,] + lB? By Lemma 17, t S,,,+lBew[lS,], and so t S” + 
lB@. 
Suppose B = EIC. 
If M, w k ElC, then by Lemma 6’, N’,w k FiC. Thus for all such that wS’x, 
N’,x l= C, and by Lemma 6’, for all x such that wS’x, M,x k C, and by the I.H., 
for all x such that wS’x, t S,* C@. So t- V {S,: wS’x}-+ C’@, and thus 
t o[V {S,: wS’x}]+ Be. By Lemma 20’, l- SW+ O[V {S,: wS’x}], whence 
t S,-+ B4 
If M,w #EC, then for some x, WSX, M,x #C, and by the I.H. t &+lC@, 
whence tlO[~!$]-t~B@. By Lemma 18, tS,+l@[X?,], ES,+lB? 
Done. 0 
Since M, 0 i# A, by Lemma 22’) 1 SC,-, 1A @‘. Since S,, is true, A @ is false. 
Historical remarks 
Most of the techniques of proof of the present paper are due to K.N. Ignatiev 
and found in [3]. That Solovay sentences SW could be constructed directly with the 
aid of the multiple diagonal lemma for closed sentences was first indicated in [2], 
where Dzhaparidze proved the arithmetical completeness of GLP with respect to 
the reading of 0 and fl as ‘is provable’ and ‘has an o-inconsistent negation’. One 
major technical innovation of [2] was the construction of a Solovay-style function 
h with domain a finite initial segment of N. Ref. [4] shows explicitly how Solovay 
sentences can be obtained, as they are here, by diagonalizing on Boolean 
combinations of the provability and provability-witness-comparison predicates. A 
n: witness comparison predicate for o-provability such as the p of Lemma 3 then 
turns out to be all that is needed to graft Ignatiev’s methods onto analysis. (The 
recursion theory used in the proof of Lemma 3 is somewhat simpler than that 
employed in [9], where Solovay closely follows [8] and defines an h with domain 
the whole of op. Albert Visser has pointed out to the author that Lemma 4 can 
also be derived from the stage comparison theorem of [5].) 
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